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Abstract
The debate over the economic effects of military spending continues to develop, with
no consensus, but a deepening understanding of the issues and limitations of previous
work. A recent survey has suggested that the inclusion of post Cold War data has tended
to make finding a negative effect more common, but issues remain (Dunne and Tian,
2013). One particularly important issue that has not been adequately dealt with, is the
possible endogeneity of military spending in the growth equation, mainly because of the
difficulty of finding any variables that would make adequate instruments. This paper
considers the likely importance of endogeneity, using conflict onset as an instrument for
military spending in an endogenous growth model for a panel of African countries 1989-
2010. Following a brief review of the literature the theoretical and empirical models are
outlined and the use of conflict onset as an instrumental variable for military spending in
the panel estimates is justified. The empirical analysis suggests that endogeneity is likely
to be an important issue and using IV estimation provides a larger significant negative
effect for military spending on growth than OLS. It also identifies a further potential
bias in the same direction in studies not including non-military spending in the growth
equation. These results imply that the damaging effects of military spending on growth
in Africa are being underestimated in most studies. While it is clear that conflict onset
is a suitable and successful instrument in this analysis, the results are not directly gener-
alisable. Conflict onset is unlikely to be applicable to a larger and more diverse panel of
countries. What is of general concern is the finding that endogeneity is important and is
likely to be influencing the results of studies of military spending and growth. It is im-
portant that future research tries to deal with endogeneity and the search for reasonable
instruments is one that needs to engage researchers.
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1. Introduction
The literature on the economic effects of military spending continues to be the subject
of considerable debate, though with a lack of any consensus in the literature (Dunne and
Uye, 2009). Research has led to an improved understanding of the processes by which
military spending may influence growth, but has also shown the complexity of trying
to tease out the economic processes at work. As more post Cold War data becomes
available, the advantage of a more complex strategic environment and more movement in
the data should be making the identification of any long run relationships more apparent
and this does seem to be the case. Once the estimation period is not dominated by the
specifics of the Cold War, the results seem to be more consistent in finding a negative
relation between military spending and growth (Dunne and Tian, 2013). There is, of
course, considerable heterogeneity and while results are being shown to be relatively
robust, there is still considerable work to be done. Much of the recent cross country work
has used panel data and has taken advantage of the growing experience of dynamic panel
data models to good effect. Most recent studies start with an underlying theoretical
model, some form of endogenous or exogenous growth model, with military spending or
burden included as an explanatory variable, providing a possible theoretical justification
for this adopted growth model, but in general the addition of military spending is done
in a relatively ad hoc manner (Dunne et al., 2005).
Once an empirical model has been specified, it is estimated as a single equation
growth model, which tends to side step an important issue of potential endogeneity.
Military spending may be affected by growth and the literature on the demand for military
spending suggests that it is (Dunne et al., 2008). One reason for the lack of consideration
of this issue is that it is very difficult to think of useful instruments for military spending.
This raises similar issues to those in the debate over the impact of aid on growth in
developing countries, summarised in Deaton (2010).
This paper considers the likely importance of endogeneity, using an endogenous growth
model for a panel of Sub Saharan African (SSA) countries 1989-2010. The next section
provides a brief review of the literature on the effects of military expenditure on growth.
Section 3 then presents the the theoretical model, with Section 4 discussing the empirical
models, discussing identification issues and justifying the use of the proposed instrument,
namely conflict onset, for the panel of SSA countries. Then, Section 5 describes the data
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and provides some empirical justification for the chosen instrument. This is followed by
estimation results in Section 6, which show that using IV estimation provides a larger
significant negative effect for military spending on growth than OLS. It also identifies a
further potential bias in the same direction in studies not including non-military spending
in the growth equation. These results imply that the damaging effects of military spend-
ing on growth in Africa are being underestimated in most studies. Section 7 provides
some analysis of the robustness of the results, checking to see if the bias found could
be explained by short term fluctuations, considering possible non linearities produced
by threat and using subsamples and forward lags to consider the appropriateness of the
instrumental variable. The results are found to be robust. Finally some conclusions are
presented in Section 8.
2. Military Expenditure and Growth
Developing a theoretical model is important for any empirical study, but much of
economic theory does not have an explicit role for military spending as a distinctive eco-
nomic activity. However, this has not prevented the development of theoretical analyses
as discussed in Dunne and Coulomb (2008). In empirical work the fact that there is no
agreed theory of growth among economists means that there is no standard framework
that military spending can be fitted into. Clearly, in developing countries military spend-
ing, conflict, economic capacity (education, governance, institutions, natural resources)
all interact to influence growth. Indeed, many poor countries, even those with civil wars,
spend relatively little on the military. In particular many African countries have low mil-
itary burdens, but there are other obstacles to growth (Collier, 2007). Theoretical work
has allowed the identification of a number of channels through which military spending
can impact on the economy, in the short run through potential substitution effects with
other government components, and in long run through labour, capital, technology, ex-
ternal relations, socio political effects, debt, conflicts etc. (Dunne and Tian, 2013). The
relative importance and sign of these effects and the overall impact on growth can only
be ascertained by empirical analysis.
An important issue in empirical work is the identification problem that results from
the fact that we observe military spending and growth changing and both are influenced
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by security threats. If the economic determinants of growth are constant, but there are
increases in the security threat - which are positively correlated with military spending - a
negative relationship between military expenditure and output will be observed. On the
other hand, if the threat decreases, a positive relationship between military expenditure
and output will be observed, without the other variables changing. This can be used
to explain some country experiences with different combinations of growth and military
expenditure. It also suggests caution in interpreting the results of empirical studies
(Smith, 2000).
Clearly all of the channels mentioned will interact and their influence will vary de-
pending on the countries involved. For example, a relatively advanced developing country
will have concerns over the industrial impact of their involvement in arms production,
the technology and foreign direct investment benefits versus the opportunity cost, while
a poorer African economy may be more concerned with the conflict trap they find them-
selves in Collier (2007).
The debate in the empirical literature on the economic effects of military spending
started with the contribution of Benoit (1973, 1978), which purported to show that
military expenditure and development went hand in hand. This led to considerable
research activity using econometric analysis to overcome the deficiencies, most of which
has tended not to support Benoit, but there is still no consensus view (Dunne and Uye,
2009). Surveys of the military spending-growth literature include Chan (1987), who found
a lack of consistency in the results, Ram (1995) who reviewed 29 studies, concluding little
evidence of a positive effect of defence outlays on growth, but that it was also difficult to
say the evidence supported a negative effect. Dunne (1996) covering 54 studies concluded
that military spending had at best no effect on growth and was likely to have a negative
effect, certainly that there was no evidence of positive effects and (Smith, 2000) observed
that the large literature did not indicate any robust empirical regularity, positive or
negative, though he felt there was a small negative effect in the long run, but one that
requires considerably more sophistication to find. Smaldone (2006) in his review of Africa
considered military spending relationships to be heterogeneous, elusive and complex, but
argued that variations could be explained by intervening variables, with negative effects
tending to be wider and deeper in countries experiencing legitimacy/security crisis and
economic/budgetary constraints. Dunne and Uye (2009) in a survey of 102 studies on the
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economic effects of military spending in developing countries find only around 20% have
a positive effect and that models allowing for a demand side, and hence the possibility of
crowding out investment, tend to find negative effects, unless there is some reallocation
to other forms of government spending. Those with only a supply side find positive, or
positive but insignificant, effects, something that is not surprising, given such models
are inherently structured to find such as result (d’Agostino et al. 2012c,b; Dunne 2012
summarise the debate). More recently, Dunne and Tian (2013) survey almost 170 studies
and suggests that the availability of increasing post cold war data, with its higher signal to
noise ratio, is leading to more consistent results than in the past and moving the literature
towards a consensus finding, that military spending has a negative impact on economic
growth. But concerns remain, particularly over issues of identification and endogeneity
which, often discussed in the determinants of conflict literature are seldom considered
in the milex-growth literature, aside from the use of GMM methods that instrument
with predetermined variables for military spending. This is mainly due to the lack of
obvious candidate variable that could be used as instruments. This paper considers the
importance and effects of endogeneity on growth, but first the theoretical model employed
in the analysis is presented.
3. The baseline endogenous growth model
Consider an economy consisting of representative household and government. The
household produces a single composite commodity, which can be consumed, accumulated
as capital or paid as income tax. It derives utility from consumption c by maximising
the discounted sum of future utilities:
U(c) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu(c)dt, where u(c) = ln(c) (1)
where ρ is the rate of time preference and where the functional form of the instantaneous
utility function u(c) is expressed in a logarithmic form. Total output per capita y is
produced with a constant returns to scale technology, which uses the private capital
stock k, and two different forms of government spending, denoted g1 and g2. If the
functional form is Cobb Douglas, then the relationship can be expressed as:
y = Ak1−α−βgα1 g
β
2 , 0 < α, β < 1, (2)
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where A is the exogenous technology and α and β are the relative productivity parameters
of g1 and g2, respectively. The resultant private capital accumulation function is:
k˙ = (1− τ)y − c (3)
where τ is the is a flat-rate income tax1. The government is assumed to collect income
tax revenue τ to finance total public spending g, between the components g1 and g2
(Devarajan et al., 1996) and φ1 and φ2 denote the share of resources devoted to each
component. The government budget constraint is then:
g = τy = g1 + g2 (4)
g1 = φ1τy (5)
g2 = φ2τy (6)
Taking the government’s decisions and τ as given2, the representative household choses
the optimal amount of private consumption so as to maximise (1) subject to the private
(3), public (4), (5), (6) and the initial level of private capital k. The steady state growth
equation is:
c˙
c
= γ = (1− α− β)(1− τ)A (g1)α (g2)β
(g
k
)α+β
− ρ. (7)
Then, by assuming that along the steady state growth path the tax rate τ is constant
(which means that also g/k is constant), we can manipulate (7) by using (2), (4), (5),
(6) to specify the steady state growth equation in terms of shares of resources devoted to
each component φ1 and φ2
3. Hence the steady state growth equation becomes:
c˙
c
= γ = (1− α− β)(1− τ)A 11−α−β τ α+β1−α−β (φ1)
α
1−α−β (φ2)
β
1−α−β − ρ (8)
1Since our focus is on the composition of expenditure, we abstract from issues of financing of gov-
ernment expenditures. This means that there is no deficit financing in the model as the government
is constrained to run a balanced budget, and that the role of the structure of taxes is not analysed in
examining the effect of total government spending on per-capita growth (Devarajan et al., 1996).
2While we do not analyse the government’s decision problem choosing expenditure or the tax rate, we
are implicitly assuming that the government chooses the tax rate τ . Since the government is constrained
to run a balanced budget in the model, this effectively means that the level of government expenditure
g is determined by default.
3For an extensive description of the model, see d’Agostino et al. (2012b).
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Here, we investigate the properties of the model by deriving the optimal levels of the
different components of government expenditure, φi = [φ1, φ2]. By assuming that the
rules of financing 4, 5, 6 hold, from equation 4, we use the following condition:
2∑
i=1
φi = 1 =⇒ φ1 = 1− φ2, (9)
in which the effect of the component φ1 on the growth rate is characterised by the re-
lationhip with the other share of government spending. That is, if the financing rule
(9) is always binding, the effect of the components of government spending depends on
the relative share φi and output elasticities. Indeed, by combining (8) with (9) to give
c˙
c
= γ = (1 − α − β)(1 − τ)A 11−α−β τ α+β1−α−β (φ1)
α
1−α−β (1− φ1)
β
1−α−β − ρ, we find that the
partial derivative of γ with respect to φ1 is:
∂γ
∂φ1
=
{[
α
φ1
− β
φ2
]
λ
}
(10)
where λ = (1−τ)A 11−α−β τ α+β1−α−β (φ1)
α
1−α−β (1− φ1)
β
1−α−β > 0, and the sign of the partial
derivative depends on the parameters in the squared parentheses of the equation.
For example, to investigate whether the government spending component g1 is pro-
ductive, the partial differential of output with respect to φ1 requires that:
∂γ
∂φ1
≥ 0 if φ1
φ2
≤ α
β
,
while the component of government spending will be classified unproductive if:
∂γ
∂φ1
< 0 if
φ1
φ2
>
α
β
.
This model formulation allows the impact of an exogenous shock that changes one
component of government spending to be analysed, taking into account whether this
effect will lead to an increase or a decrease in economic growth rate. In this paper,
the exogenous shocks on government spending are episodes of armed conflict involving
a country, at a given time t, and government spending is divided into military and civil
components.
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4. The empirical model
As section 2 argued, estimating the effect of military spending on the growth rate of
GDP is not a trivial task and for this reason the variety of empirical results obtained
in the empirical work should not be surprising. Much of the literature has focused on
estimating cross-country regressions and has dealt with a range of issues. There has, how-
ever, been little concern for the possibility that the estimated relationships could have
problems of omitted variables, with unobserved variables affecting economic growth and
military spending simultaneously and so biasing the estimation results, or reverse causa-
tion, resulting from economic growth increasing the resources available for government
spending and so increasing military spending. A related issue arises from the theoreti-
cal endogeneous growth model in section 3. When the government budget constraint is
given, a shock that increases military spending may also reduce other forms of govern-
ment spending, such as education, health or general government spending, which might
also have an effect on growth. So it would seem sensible to extend the empirical model to
allow for controlling the potential contemporaneous reallocation of resources across the
different components of government spending on growth.
Focusing upon the military component of government spending, the cross country
relation between military spending (Militaryi) and economic growth (γi) has generally
been specified as a reduced form equation in which Non military is included to control
for contemporaneous government spending re-allocation :
γi = β0 + β1Militaryit + β2Non militaryit + β3Xit + β4Si + i (11)
where Xi is a vector of control variables and Si individual country effects. This specifica-
tion would ignore useful information from the time variation in the data and to overcome
this much recent empirical work has applied this form of model to panel data.
There still remains a possible identification problem. As argued before, military spend-
ing may be influenced by feedback effects, as increased growth may lead to increased mil-
itary spending, or expectations of the outcome of the process undertaken by the state to
allocate expenditures allocation, may be correlated with the current growth rate. Thus,
military expenditure cannot simply be assumed to be exogenous, so the empirical esti-
mates are not easy to interpret because there are potentially other factors at play. To
8
deal with this, an instrumental variable (IV) approach can be used, but the problem is
identifying suitable instruments. What is needed is a variable that has a zero covariance
between itself and the errors in the growth equation and a non zero covariance between
itself and military spending. It is not clear what would make a good instrument, a prob-
lem that is not restricted to this issue, as the debate over growth and aid summarised in
Deaton (2010) shows.
One candidate is the onset of armed conflict in a country. At first sight this might
not seem a sensible instrument, given its possible relation with growth, but it is likely to
act as a shock on military spending but not necessarily on growth and whether it has a
zero covariance with the growth equation errors can be tested empirically. It certainly
seems worthwhile investigating its suitability empirically as the literature has generally
suggested a causal path from economic growth to the onset of conflict (see Collier and
Hoeﬄer 2004; Miguel et al. 2004). It would also appear that military spending increases
with the onset of the conflict, as measured by the PRIO fatalities threshold of 25 deaths,
but the damaging effects of conflict on the economy could start before or after that. In
this way conflict onset is a good candidate as an IV for military spending.
Formally, specifying the growth and military spending reduced forms as:
γit = δ0 + δ1Armed conflictit + δ2Non militaryit + δ3Xit + δ4Si + δ5Tt + uit(12)
Militaryit = θ0 + θ1Armed conflictit + θ2Non militaryit + θ3Xit + θ4Si + θ5Tt + vit(13)
in which Tt accounts for time-varying unobserved effects, with Xit and Si as defined
above. The causal effects of military spending on growth can be obtained by estimating:
γit = Φ0 + Φ1Militaryit + Φ2Non militaryit + Φ3Xit + Φ4Si + Φ5Tt + dit (14)
where the IV estimate of the coefficient on military spending (14) is the ratio of the
reduced form coefficients on military spending, that is Φ1 = δ1/θ1. The existence of a
clear and significant discontinuity in both military spending and growth from a shock
related to armed conflict onset would suggest that it can be used to identify and estimate
the impact of military spending on growth (Hahn et al., 2001; Oreopoulos, 2006). This
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issue is considered empirically in a next section.
5. Data and econometric issues
To estimate the model, data was collected for sub-Saharan African countries for the
period 1989 to 2010, with two armed conflict variables constructed using the battle-
related deaths per year: conflict onset (Armed conflict (onset)it) and conflict intensity
(Armed conflict (intensity)it). These are binary variables that take the value 1 if the
conflict has exceeded 25 (i.e., minor conflicts) or 1000 (i.e., major conflict) battle-related
deaths, and 0 if it has not. This data was taken from the International Peace Research
Institute of Oslo, Norway (PRIO), and University of Uppsala4 and has the advantage
of recording both of these variables (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). The growth rate of
per-worker GDP (γit) and the log value of GDP per-capita (Ln(GDP per capita)t) were
taken from Penn World Table 7.0. and are chain indices, measured in 2005 U.S. dollars.
Military spending, as percentage of GDP (Militaryit), was taken from the Stockholm In-
ternational Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database (SIPRI Yearbook, 2012). Civilian
public spending as a share of GDP (Nonmilitaryit) was computed by subtracting mil-
itary spending in GDP from the government consumption share of PPP adjusted GDP
per capita at current prices. A variable describing the trade openness of a country (open),
measured by the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP, was taken from
the Penn World Table 7.0. The World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)
provided figures for arable land as percentage of land area (araland), and a religious
fractionalisation index (frac) was taken from Fearon and Latin (2003). Finally, the WDI
provided data on net official development assistance and official aid received (aid) at con-
stant 2008 US dollars5. Appendix A reports the variables and their sources and presents
some descriptive statistics.
As discussed in section 4, the IV approach proposed, using conflict as an instrument
for military spending, requires empirical justification, but to be certain that conflict acts
4An armed conflict is defined in the PRIO/Uppsala database as a contested incompatibility, which
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at
least one is the government of a state.
5Net official development assistance consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms
(net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assis-
tance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic
development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients (World-Bank,
several year).
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as an exogenous shock to the countries, it is first necessary to exclude any countries
that have non-consecutive periods of armed conflict (i.e., multiple conflicts over time)
along with countries those that were already involved in conflict in the year the data
series start. Next, it is necessary to show that conflict onset has the properties required
of an instrument. To get some idea of the impact of conflict onset Figure 1 shows the
share of military spending in GDP for countries affected by conflict, before and after
the year in which the conflict started. The horizontal line in Figure 1 shows the change
in the cross-country mean of the variable. There is a clear and marked increase of the
proportion of military spending in GDP for each country after the onset of conflict.
Figure 2 does the same for growth and shows that countries affected by conflict have
lower growth immediately after the start of the conflict, implying a negative correlation
between conflict and growth.
Figure 1: Cross-country mean of military spending before and after the armed conflict
onset
Notes: This graph shows countries affected by the onset of conflict in the period, defined as an armed conflict in progress with at least 25
battle deaths per year. The left hand panel shows the country mean of military burden in the year before the armed conflict and the right
hand panel the same for the year after the onset of conflict. The mean does not include Eritrea because in the year before the conflict (1996)
it had a military burden of 20.03 per cent and 32.5 per cent in 1997. The values for Eritrea are scaled down by a proportion of 5 to assist in
the visualisation.
The econometric question is whether conflict onset is a valid instrument in this sit-
uation6. This means asking first, whether it significantly explains part of the variation
in military spending and, second, checking that it is not correlated with the unobserved
factors in both the growth rate and military spending equations. To test the first issue,
the reduced form military spending equation (12) is estimated to see if conflict onset is
6The same argumentation can be used for armed conflict intensity, the other variable which use in
the estimations.
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a strong predictor for military spending. Following Miguel et al. (2004) a ”false experi-
ment” is used to evaluate identification, by extending the reduced form (equation 13) to
include the conflict onset variable at time t + 1, which should be orthogonal to current
military spending. Prior to that it is possible to provide a descriptive analysis, by pre-
senting the results of a nonparametric local regression of armed conflict onset on military
spending graphically using the Epanechnikov kernel method. The left panel of Figure 3
shows a positive and approximately linear relationship between the instrument and the
endogenous variable, suggesting it is not a weak instrument by this criteria Bound et al.
(1995). The right hand panel of Figure 3 shows the results for conflict intensity and while
it still indicates a positive relationship, there seems to be some evidence of nonlinearity
which weakens the case for using this variable as an instrument for military spending.
Figure 2: Cross-country mean of growth rate before and after the armed conflict onset
Notes: This graph uses the sample of countries that during these years were affected by the onset of conflict defined as an armed conflict in
progress with at least 25 battle deaths per year. On the left, it is reported the country mean of the growth rate in the year before the armed
conflict, whereas on the right the mean for the same variable after the onset of conflict.
Note that the variation induced by the armed conflict is ”local” in nature, in the
sense that countries change their military spending in response to this exogenous shock.
Imbens and Angrist (1994); Angrist (1995); Angrist et al. (1996) show that under cer-
tain conditions, with heterogeneous treatment effects the IV method identifies the Local
Average Treatment Effect (LATE), that is the average effect of a treatment on those
countries whose treatment status is changed by the instrument. If monoticity is assumed
this interpetation can be used to explain the role of conflict onset as an instrument.
As regards estimation, there is another problem to solve, that plagues most analy-
ses of the link between categories of government expenditure and growth. It is possible
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Figure 3: Current military spending and armed conflict onset/intensity, conditional on
time fixed effects and control variables.
Notes: This graph plots military spending and armed conflict onset/intensity residuals. The continuous line is the local polynomial smoothed
line, whereas the dashed lines are the 95% confidence intervals. Armed conflict onset/intensity residuals are obtained using a non parametric
estimation procedure conditional on time fixed effects and control variables. Military spending residuals are obtained by a linear regression
model, conditional on time fixed effects and control variables.
that there is joint endogeneity between categories of government expenditure and reverse
causality between military spending and growth. So if military and non military spending
are considered expected growth might allow increases in both or, rather than a trade off.
This would suggest that if military spending is found to be negatively associated with
growth, it need not necessarily mean that it is unproductive in the usual macroeconomic
sense (e.g., Barro 1990). As an example, slow-growing countries could be affected by
intermediate variables, such as political instability, spend more on the military to re-
duce internal threats and then later allocate more to productive government spending to
increase growth. This issue is returned to later and potential endogeneity is tested for.
6. Results
Estimating equations 12, 13 and 14, gave the results in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Columns (1)-
(2) of Table 1 show the results for the first stage (equations 12 and 13), with conflict onset
having a significant positive effect on military spending, at over 99 percent significance
level, using time fixed effects (regression 1, column 1a: θ1 = 1.649), and this relationship
is robust to the inclusion of country controls (regression 2, column 2a: θ1 = 1.476; s.e. =
0.349)7 .
7Note that, while such country-specific characteristics are generally difficult to measure completely,
those described in Section 4 are proven to influence per-capita growth (Miguel et al., 2004).
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Table 1: Armed conflict onset, armed conflict intensity and military spending (Equation
13) - Dependent variable: military spending
Specifications
Explanatory variables (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Armed conflict (onset)it 1.649 1.476 1.617
[0.337] [0.367] [0.483]
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
Armed conflict (onset)it+1 -0.201
(0.650)
[0.442]
Armed conflict (intensity)it 0.568 0.289 0.116
[0.338] [0.348] [0.495]
(0.094) (0.408) (0.814)
Armed conflict (intensity)it+1 0.240
[0.483]
(0.620)
Non militaryit -0.005 -0.075 -0.042 -0.121 -0.042 -0.121
[0.013] [0.014] [0.019] [0.017] [0.019] [0.017]
(0.725) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000)
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-specific variables no no yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 474 580 412 514 412 514
Log-likelihood -810.967 -900.439 -713.622 -798.534 -712.271 -797.291
R2 0.849 0.872 0.861 0.885 0.860 0.885
Notes: Standard errors are in square brackets, while p-value are reported in round parenthesis. The vector of the
control variables are listed in Appendix A and described in the footnote of the same table.
Including armed conflict onset at time t+ 1, gives a coefficient estimate that is small
and not significant (θ′1 = −0.201; s.e. = 0.650) providing, along with the results of Figure
3, further support for the use of conflict onset as an instrument. When the armed
conflict intensity variable is used, the results are as expected (column b, Table 1), but
the coefficient estimate is smaller than for conflict onset and, interestingly, the significance
level is only at the minimum of the confidence interval (e.g., 90% significance level) in
column (1b) of Table 1. This suggests that the two indicators of conflict are likely to
be having different effects, with the conflict onset picking up conflicts quickly and the
intensity variable, with its higher battle death requirement, only kicking in after the
conflict has been going on for a while. This could mean that by the time the intensity
variable picks up the existence of a ”major conflict” it is less likely to have an exogenous
shock or lead to unexpected reactions in terms of expenditures on the military sector by
policy-makers.
Non military spending has significant coefficient estimates in the regression when time
fixed effects and country variables are controlled for (column 2 in Table 1). The estimate
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of a negative coefficient (θ2 = −0.042; s.e. = 0.019) is evidence of contemporaneous
substitutions within government spending and, more importantly, when significant, its
inclusion reduces potential upward bias of the estimated coefficients8.
Table 2: Armed conflict onset, armed conflict intensity and per-capita GDP growth rate
(Equation 12) - Dependent variable: per-capita GDP growth
Specifications
Explanatory Variables (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Armed conflict (onset)it -5.108 -4.097
[1.064] [1.090]
(0.000) (0.000)
Armed conflict (intensity)it -2.592 -1.753
[1.224] [1.226]
(0.035) (0.154)
Non militaryit 0.092 0.039 0.138 0.061
[0.043] [0.053] [0.057] [0.061]
(0.033) (0.462) (0.018) (0.324)
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Country-specific variables no no yes yes
Number of observations 474 604 412 514
Log-likelihood -1356.794 -1707.029 -1163.353 -1444.977
R2 0.151 0.133 0.221 0.178
Notes: Standard errors are in square brackets, while p-value are reported in round parenthesis. The
vector of the control variables are listed in Appendix A and described in the footnote of the same
table.
Estimating the reduced form growth equation (e.g., equation 12) gave the results
in Table 2, which show conflict onset and intensity to have negative and significant
coefficient estimates for all the specifications. The results in column (1), using the onset
of conflict, gave a point estimate of −5.108 (s.e. = 1.034), which declines in absolute
terms to around −4.1 (s.e. = 1.090) when country control variables are included. This
is the preferred specification discussed below, as the vector of control variables (i.e., net
official development assistance and official aid received, trade openness, percentage of
arable land area, and religious fractionalization) are statistically significant at the 95
percent significance level. Interestingly, these estimates suggest that the onset of conflict
causes a reduction in the per-capita GDP growth rate that is somewhat larger that 2.2%
per annum reduction in growth rate that Collier (1999) estimated for civil wars and that
has been generally supported by more recent studies (Dunne, 2012).
8The coefficient θ1 estimated without including the non military variable in the specification of column
2a is 1.406.
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When conflict intensity is used the coefficient estimates are lower than the onset co-
efficients by more than 2 percentage points and the inclusion of country-control variables
affects their significance (e.g., column 2 of the specification 2, in Table 3). Finding a
positive and significant correlation between non military expenditure and the growth of
per capita GDP in the reduced form equation using armed conflict onset (Equation 12),
is consistent with earlier findings in the literature (d’Agostino et al., 2012b,a), and indi-
cates that excluding non military spending from estimated growth equations is likely to
mean upward biased estimates, because of the positive relation between the errors and
the growth rate9.
Table 3: Military spending and per-capita GDP growth rate (IV estimates; instrument:
Armed conflict onset) - Dependent variable: per-capita GDP growth
Specifications
Explanatory Variables (1) (2)
IV OLS IV OLS
Militaryit -3.098 -0.232 -2.776 -0.169
[0.893] [0.148] [1.001] [0.150]
(0.001) (0.118) (0.006) (0.264)
Non militaryit 0.078 0.125 0.021 0.175
[0.060] [0.043] [0.096] [0.058]
(0.202) (0.004) (0.827) (0.003)
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Country-specific variables no no yes yes
Partial-R2 0.158 0.144
Number of observations 475 474 414 412
Notes: Standard errors are in square brackets, while p-value are reported in round
parenthesis. The vector of the control variables are listed in Table 1 and described
in the footnote of the same table. IV estimates are obtained from Equation 14,
whereas OLS estimates from Equation 11. At the bottom of the IV columns are
listed Partial-R2 Shea (1997) which measures of instrument relevance.
The results in Table 3 for the IV estimator of equation (14), assuming conflict onset is
a valid instrument, show military burden to significantly and negatively affect per-capita
GDP growth. As mentioned earlier, the reduced-form estimates can provide a check
for the IV method as the structural parameter estimate for the coefficient on military
burden is given by Φi = δi/θi. The point estimate for conflict onset is Φ1 = −3.098
(p−value = 0.004), which is equal to the ratio of the reduced form parameters in equation
2 and 1 respectively (i.e., −5.108/1.648 = −3.098). As expected, the IV estimates are
9This coefficient moves from −4.097 in our best specification to −5.349 when non military spending
is excluded from the Equation 12.
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not very different when the model includes country-control variables (i.e., Φ1 = −2.776
(p− value = 0.006)). The relatively low standard error on Φ1 provides some support for
the use of the instrument and the partial R2 or Shea test (Shea, 1997) is also reported in
the Table10. Its value of about 0.15 shows that the conflict onset variable accounts for a
significant amount of the correlation with respect to the endogenous variable, suggesting
it is relevant as an instrument, with conflict intensity having a slightly smaller value.
For comparison, Table 3 presents the least squares regression results for equation (11).
The coefficients estimates have the expected signs, but are considerably smaller in mag-
nitude than the IV estimates and have a threshold of significance slightly above the 10%
level in both of the models. The coefficient estimate for military burden in model (1) is
−0.232 (p − value = 0.148) and −0.169 (p − value = 0.150) when country-control vari-
ables are added, suggesting that endogeneity may be important and may be biasing the
estimated parameters. As argued above, OLS regression is undoubtedly affected by un-
observable factors that produce upward bias; for example countries involved in a conflict
are more likely to adopt similar institutional behaviours, such as lobbying, rent-seeking
etc., that could have a positive impact on military spending. This would imply that, in
the growth equation, military spending and the error term are positively correlated and
so the OLS estimate will underestimate the causal effect of military spending. This is
an important finding as it suggests that dealing with endogeneity tends to increase the
size and significance of the negative impact of military burden, which might explain why
in the past many studies of developing countries have found a negative, but insignificant
effect (Dunne and Uye, 2009).
7. Alternative specifications, sensitivity of samples and robustness
There are a number of potentially important issues that may limit the reliability and
robustness of the results. First, it is possible that the results might be being driven by
short run fluctuations. Second, it is possible that there are non linear relations that are not
being picked up, in particular as identified in the literature, military spending may have
different impacts at different levels of ’threat’. Finally, it is possible that endogeneity
10In this case, the model contains only military spending as an endogenous variable, but more than
one exogenous variable and corresponds to the statistic known as partial R2 by Bound, Jaeger and Baker
(1995). That is, it equals the squared correlation between the share of the military spending and the fit
of the relevant endogenous variable orthogonal to the vector of the exogenous variables.
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and causality may still remain despite the steps taken, reducing the reliability of the
estimates. This section now considers these issues and the robustness of the results.
Previous work on conflict has recognised the possibility of results being driven by
short run fluctuations and starting from Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) researchers have used
five year averages to eliminate them γt, t+4. To consider this issue, and in the interests of
maintaining the number of time series observations in the data, a moving average method
was used on the data and the preferred model was estimated by IV, giving the results in
Table 4.
Table 4: Military spending and per-capita GDP growth rate (IV estimates; instrument:
Armed conflict onset) - Dependent variable: five-year average growth (γt, t+4)
Specifications
Explanatory variables (1) (2)
Militaryit -2.163 -1.931
[0.577] [0.630]
(0.000) (0.002)
Non militaryit 0.046 -0.015
[0.042] [0.062]
(0.284) (0.802)
Time fixed effect yes yes
Country-specific variables no yes
Number of observations 412 372
Notes: Standard errors are in square brackets, while p-
value are reported in parenthesis. The vector of the control
variables are listed in Appendix A and described in the
footnote of the same table.
These results are consistent with those for the annual data in showing a negative and
statistically significant effect of military spending on growth, with a unit increase in the
ratio of military spending to total expenditure decreasing the growth rate by about 2
percentage points. That this is lower than for the annual data is expected, as military
spending fluctuations in the short term are also drivers of institutional and economic
changes that can indirectly amplify the negative response of γt. As further support for
these findings, semi-elasticity estimates for military spending are presented in Table 5,
which give similar estimates.
Considering the potential impact of external threat, which could lead countries to
maintain persistently higher levels of military spending and countries with high levels of
threat might see military spending influence growth differently that countries with low
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Table 5: Estimates of semi-elasticities
Specifications
Response variables (1) (2)
γt -2.7279 -2.723
[1.027] [1.233]
(0.008) (0.027)
γt+4 -1.733 -2.014
[0.527] [0.757]
(0.001) (0.008)
Notes: The coefficients are semi-elasticity measures
and are calculated from coefficients presented in Table
3 and 4. Delta-method is used to calculate standard
errors (square brackets), while p-value are reported
in round parenthesis. Formally, the semi-elasticity is
given by: Φ1(
1
γ¯
), where Φ1 is the estimated parame-
ter of military spending in GDP from equation 14 and
γ¯ is the mean value of the per-capita GPD growth
rate.
threat levels (Aizenman and Glick, 2006; Pieroni, 2009). This is pertinent in this context,
as countries that are more likely to be involved in armed civil conflict are likely to be more
prone to high military spending. If this is the case, threat is an omitted variable and may
bias the estimated causal effect. To consider whether such geographical spillovers are
important an informal test procedure is to compare the full sample results with a sample
that excludes both countries with the highest share of military spending and those that
did not experience armed (civil) conflict onset, i.e., Botswana, Namibia, Seychelles, and
Togo and comparing these results with those for all countries. Table 6 (part a) shows the
parameter estimates from estimating these two groups using both annual and five-year
average data. The coefficients are clearly negative and significant and are close to those
of the benchmark models, meaning that the nonlinearities mentioned have limited effects
on the results and so do not need to be considered further.
Finally, even though the onset of civil conflict is a ”good instrument”, there remains
concern that reverse causality may still be important. One way of testing for this is
to see if specifying the dependent variable as a forward lag influences the estimates.
Modelling military expenditure in period t as affecting growth in the forward lag period
t+ 1 (e.g., γt+1), or in the five-year average growth rate (e.g., γt+1,t+5), from period t+ 1
through t+ 5, and interpreting any significant differences with the benchmark estimates
of the model in equation (14), or its specification at t+ 5, as evidence of the existence of
potential endogeneity. Table 6 (part b) presents these estimates and the results support
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Table 6: Military spending and per-capita GDP growth rate (IV estimates; instrument:
Armed conflict onset)
Specifications
(a) (b)
Sub-sample Forward lag(s)
excluding highest growth rate
Explanatory variables military spending (full-sample)
γt γt+1,t+5 γt+1 γt+1,t+5
Militaryit -2.651 -1.731 -2.752 -1.737
[0.941] [0.554] [1.265] [0.533]
(0.005) (0.002) (0.018) (0.007)
Non militaryit 0.057 0.025 0.009 -0.038
[0.090] [0.054] [0.113] [0.053]
(0.526) (0.643) (0.936) (0.478)
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Country-specific variables no no yes yes
Number of observations 384 345 389 350
Notes: Standard errors are in square brackets, while p-value are reported in round paren-
thesis. The vector of the control variables are listed in Appendix A and described in the
footnote of the same table.
the main findings, with the estimated coefficient for the forward lag military spending
variable negative and significant and, while smaller, close to the benchmark estimates of
the Table 3 and 4. So the results of this section suggest that the empirical estimates in
Section 6 can be reported with confidence.
8. Conclusions
The debate over the economic effects of military spending continues to develop, with
no consensus, but a deepening understanding of the issues and limitations of previous
work. One important issue, that has not been adequately dealt with is the possible
endogeneity of military spending in the growth equation. This paper has provided a
novel approach to dealing with this issue. It developed an endogenous growth model that
allows for the effects of different components of military spending and then developed
an estimation strategy that deals with the potential endogeneity of military spending,
using conflict onset as an instrument for military spending. The use of conflict onset
was justified for a panel dataset of Sub Saharan African countries 1989-2010 and the
endogenous growth models estimated. This entailed estimating reduced form equations,
for growth and military spending, with armed conflict onset introduced as an exogenous
shock. The structural IV estimate for growth is then the ratio of the reduced form
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coefficients and corresponds to the causal estimates of the parameters associated with
military spending. As part of the procedure the impact of armed conflict was estimated,
suggesting that conflict causes a reduction of nearly 4% point in the per-capita GDP
growth rate in the sample, which is somewhat larger that 2.2% per annum reduction
in growth rate that Collier (1999) estimated for civil wars and that has been generally
supported by more recent studies (Dunne, 2012).
The empirical analysis suggested that endogeneity was an important issue and that for
this group of countries conflict onset, measured as more than 20 battle related deaths was
a successful instrument, although conflict intensity, defined as a conflict reaching 1000
deaths was not. It also identifies a further potential bias in the same direction in studies
not including non-military spending in the growth equation. Using IV estimation and
including non military spending provided a larger significant negative effect for military
spending on growth (-2.8) than would be given by an OLS estimator (-0.2). These
results imply that the damaging effects of military spending on growth in Africa are
being significantly underestimated in most studies.
While it is clear that conflict onset is a suitable and successful instrument in this
analysis, the results are not directly generalisable. The SSA group contains a number
of countries that have experienced civil conflict and are relatively poor countries and
the use of conflict onset as an instrument required the exclusion of countries that had
more than one conflict over the period. So conflict onset is unlikely to be applicable to a
larger and more diverse panel of countries. What is of general concern is the finding that
endogeneity is important and is likely to be influencing the results of studies of military
spending and growth. It is important that future research tries to deal with endogeneity
and the search for reasonable instruments is one that needs to engage researchers.
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics and data-source
Variable Source Observations Mean Standard
name deviation
A. Civil war measures
Armed conflict (onset)it PRIO Uppsala 1031 0.214 0.411
Armed conflict (intensity)it PRIO Uppsala 1031 0.157 0.364
B. Main economic variables
γ WPT 876 0.672 9.727
Militaryit SIPRI 797 2.480 3.091
Non militaryit WPT-SIPRI 764 10.381 8.742
C. Country-specific variables
araland WDI 935 12.585 12.874
Ln(aid) WDI 977 19.595 1.189
Ln(open) WPT 983 4.115 0.656
relfrac Fearon and Latin (2003) 921 48.606 18.710
Notes: Descriptive statistics refer to the entire time span 1998-2010, for the full set of analysed countries.
Since Armed conflictit and Armed conflict (intensity)it are dichotomous variable the mean describes the
incidence of armed conflicts in the whole sample. The control variable are: i) the logarithm of the net official
development assistance and official aid received at constant 2008 US dollars (Ln(aid)); ii) the logarithm of
openness at 2005 constant prices (Ln(open)); iii) Arable land as percentage of land area (araland); and iv)
religious fractionalization index (relfrac).
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Appendix B: Armed conflict onset in Sub-Saharan Africa
Country Armed conflict
Treatment status
Burundi onset 1991 (2008)
Cote d’Ivoire onset 2001 (2004)
Eritrea onset 1997 (1999)
Guinea onset 2000 (2001)
Guinea-Bissau onset 1998 (1999)
Lesotho onset 1998
Mauritania onset 2010
Sierra Leone onset 1991 (2000)
Control group
Botswana never involved
Burkina Faso never involved
Benin never involved
Cameroon never involved
Cape Verde never involved
Equatorial Guinea never involved
Gabon never involved
Gambia never involved
Ghana never involved
Kenya never involved
Madagascar never involved
Malawi never involved
Mauritius never involved
Namibia never involved
Sao Tome and Principe never involved
Seychelles never involved
South Africa never involved
Swaziland never involved
Tanzania never involved
Togo never involved
Zambia never involved
Zimbabwe never involved
Excluded countries
Angola multi-treatment onset
Central African Republic multi-treatment onset
Chad multi-treatment onset
Comoros multi-treatment onset
Congo multi-treatment onset
Djbouti multi-treatment onset
Ethiopia multi-treatment onset
Liberia multi-treatment onset
Mali multi-treatment onset
Mozanqique multi-treatment onset
Niger multi-treatment onset
Nigeria multi-treatment onset
Rwanda multi-treatment onset
Senegal multi-treatment onset
Somalia multi-treatment onset
Sudan multi-treatment onset
Uganda multi-treatment onset
Zaire multi-treatment onset
Notes: In round parenthesis we report the ended date of each onset
armed conflict.
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